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The Agricultural Lender’s Problem 
Agricultural lenders are particularly concerned with credit risk since their credit 
portfolios may be relatively under-diversified and adverse market-wide (or systematic) 
conditions may pose a significant threat to the performance of their loan portfolio and 
their business. So, how should an agricultural lender adjust its capital reserves to guard 
against unexpected downturns in the business cycle? 
The Basel Accord recognizes the existence of fluctuations in the economy and 
the impact on both default and loss rates.  The Accord makes broad recommendations 
on how a bank should adjust its capital holdings in response to market fluctuations. The 
majority of agricultural lenders, being small-to-medium sized institutions, typically do not 
have the resources to adequately explore and implement this requirement. Our objective 
in this study is to identify a consistent methodology for addressing this problem and 
develop an empirical tool that agricultural lenders might use to evaluate the implications 
of these fluctuations for the capital positions they hold. 
We explicitly model the interdependency between loan default rates and loan 
loss rates by applying the framework established by Miu and Ozdemir (2006). That 
framework enables us to develop a model which captures the correspondence between 
the probability of default and the loss given default. Miu and Ozdemir propose a stylized 
model that decomposes the correlations between loss and default rates into their 
systematic and nonsystematic components.  This allows us to isolate and forecast the 
impact of fluctuations in the business cycle on the optimal level of economic capital for a 
lender. Specifically, we project the portfolio value-at-risk that is conditional on the phase 
of the agricultural business cycle. Economic capital projections are simulated using 
@Risk, a software program that is an add-on to Microsoft Excel.  This allows us to 
develop a simulation tool that can be utilized and replicated by associations in the Farm 
Credit System. We examine a sub-portfolio of agricultural mortgage loans originated by 
AgStar Financial Services, ACA, which serves rural producers in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin. 
 
The Miu-Ozdemir Framework 
 
The Miu-Ozdemir model decomposes the relationship between probability of default 
(PD) and loss given default (LGD) for a given borrower according to the sensitivity of the 
borrower’s credit risks to a common (or shared) systematic factor and the sensitivity to 4 
borrower-specific (random or idiosyncratic) factors. These “dependencies” are 
categorized into four distinct types of correlations that exist between: (i) the systematic 
risk factors of PD and LGD for a given borrower, (ii) the idiosyncratic risk factors of PD 
and LGD for a given borrower, (iii) the PD risk drivers across different borrowers, and (iv) 
the LGD risk drivers across different borrowers (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.  Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risks. (Source: Miu and Ozdemir, 2006). 
 
It is expected that, during a recession (or downturn in the business cycle), unsecured or 
under-secured loans would exhibit higher rates of default and losses as a result of being 
more vulnerable to market-wide conditions. This phenomenon is implied by correlations 
(i) and (ii) identified above. Further, individual borrowers are susceptible to their own 
borrower-specific risks that may reduce their asset values independent of changes in 
economic conditions at large. 
In the model description that follows we draw from the model presented in Miu 
and Ozdemir (2006) and use their notation. We begin by defining the systematic PD and 5 
LGD risks, both of which are driven by the systematic risk factor Xt
1, via equations (1) 
and (2). 
 
Pt  PD  Xt PD,t,                    ( 1 )  
t LGD t LGD t X L ,      ,          ( 2 )  
 
PD,t represents the sensitivity of the systematic PD risk Pt to the market-wide risk factor 
Xt and LGD,t represents the sensitivity of the systematic LGD riskLt to the market-wide 
risk factor. By assumption, the residual changes (PD,t and LGD,t) are mutually 
independent, they are independent of  Xt, and they are normally distributed so that both 
of the systematic risks (Pt and Lt ) are standard-normally distributed. 
The borrower-specific (idiosyncratic) risks (ePD,t and eLGD,t) are assumed to be 














t LGD x e , ,      ,            ( 4 )  
 
PD,t
i  represents the sensitivity of the idiosyncratic PD risk ePD,t
i  to the standard-normally 
distributed borrower-specific credit risk factor xt
i. LGD,t
i  represents the sensitivity of the 
idiosyncratic LGD risk eLGD,t
i  to the borrower-specific credit risk factor. The mutually-
independent residual changes PD,t
i  and LGD,t
i  are assumed to be normally distributed 
with standard deviation such that the idiosyncratic risks ePD,t
i  and eLGD,t
i  are standard-
normally distributed.  
Individual PD risk is governed by both the systematic PD risk,Pt, and the 
borrower-specific PD risk, ePD,t
i , and is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. 
 
pt
i  RPD Pt  1RPD
2 ePD,t
i         ( 5 )  
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Individual LGD risk is similarly defined and is determined by both the systematic LGD 
risk,Lt, and the borrower-specific LGD risk, ePD,t




i  RLGD Lt  1RLGD
2 eLGD,t
i         ( 6 )  
 
RPD  represents the correlation between these individual PD risks and the systematic 
risk factorPt. Likewise RLGD represents the correlation between the individual LGD risks 
and the systematic risk factorLt. The authors also further specify that both systematic 
correlations, RPD andRLGD, can be shown to be pair wise correlations that represent the 
correlations between any given pair of individual PD or LGD risks, respectively.  
In (5) and (6) we implicitly define the correlation between PD and LGD for a given 
borrower due to the systematic risk factor(s).  
 
LGD PD LGD PD t t R R l p Corr    ) , (       ( 7 )  
 
By adding the correlation attributed to the idiosyncratic risk factors for each borrower, it 
follows that the complete correlation structure between PD and LGD for each 








2        (8) 
 
The first term in (8) represents the correlation due to systematic risk factors.  The 
second term in (8) represents the correlation due to idiosyncratic risk factors. 
The lower the value of the systematic risk factor, the more adverse the state of 
the market. Thus, a lower value of the systematic PD sensitivity implies a higher 
likelihood of default, as adverse market-wide effects negatively impact an obligor’s ability 
to repay debt.  
 
2
PD R  and PD are the necessary inputs to the systematic PD function in (9). In (9) 
and (10),  ) (
1  















































































Having solved for 
2
PD R  and DP in (9), we can solve for expected systematic PD 





PD t t t R
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   


    (10) 
 
We assume that the observed losses follow a beta distribution and map the 
observed LGDs onto their respective cumulative probabilities using the cumulative beta 
distribution function. We first rescale the actual LGD observations 
i
t LGD  by using the 

















         ( 1 1 )  
 
i
t LGD is the actual observed LGD, 
i




is the minimum value of all the actual LGD observations and 
MAX i
t LGD
, is the maximum 
value of the observed LGDs. By using the unconditional mean and variance of our 
range-normalized LGD observations
i
t R LGD  we can solve for the parameters  and   
in (12) and (13), where  and 
2  are the unconditional mean and variance of the range-
normalized LGD observations
i
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          ( 1 3 )  
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Solving for  and  allows us to map each of the normalized LGD observations onto 
their corresponding standard-normally distributed equivalent values. Because the Miu-
Ozdemir model requires that our representation of individual LGD risk 
i
t l  is standard-
normally distributed, we map each cumulative probability onto its corresponding value on 
the standard-normal distribution.  
 





t LGD B l
            ( 1 4 )  
 
LGD is then obtained by transforming the standard-normally distributed individual LGD 
risks appropriately using the four-parameter specification of the beta distribution,
1 where 
a and b are the minimum and the maximum of the observed LGD values. 
 
) , , , ), ( (




t    
        ( 1 5 )  
 
  Because the standard deviation of the individual LGD risks 
i
t l in each year is 
equal to
2 ˆ 1 LGD R  , we can derive the pair wise LGD correlation by calculating the 
“pooled estimate” of the standard deviation of 
i
t l . Here  t n  is the number of LGD 
observations in time period t, 
2 ˆt  is the standard deviation of 
i
t l in time period t and T is 
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         ( 1 6 )  
  
The systematic LGD risk is simply the mean of all the individual risks during a given 
year, divided by the square root of our estimated pair wise LGD correlation.  
                                                 
1 Numerous statistical packages offer the four-parameter specification of the cumulative beta 
distribution. It performs the inverse of a range-normalization transformation after determining the 
inverse of a cumulative beta probability on the standard [0, 1] domain. This allows for further 
flexibility when applying the beta distribution, as our domain does not have to be bounded 












1 , for all time periods t        ( 1 7 )  
 
At this point we ask, if loss and default rates are modeled in an acyclical manner 
– where all correlations are set to zero – by how much would these acyclical LGD and 
economic capital estimates need to be increased in order to arrive at the same value-at-
risk measures where these correlations aren’t ignored? Miu and Ozdemir’s simulation of 
different combinations of systematic and borrower-specific sensitivities shows that even 
with a moderate level of idiosyncratic PD/LGD correlation, LGD needs to be increased 
by as much as 37% when compared to estimates of economic capital that do not 
account for these correlations. In other words, acyclically-evaluated LGD estimates may 
severely understate the economic capital requirement, and these estimates need to be 
“marked up” accordingly. 
 
Application of the Miu-Ozdemir Model 
 
We develop the analysis of a loan portfolio by using @Risk, a simulation add-in 
for Microsoft Excel, and use it to incorporate the specific features of the Miu-Ozdemir 
model. For example, we take care to differentiate between the systematic and 
idiosyncratic components of the model during implementation. We are subjecting a 
portfolio of borrowers to the same systematic risk, while allowing their respective 
idiosyncratic risks to change. We use the flexibility of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) 
macros to enhance @Risk’s basic functionality in order to do so.  
As shown in this section, the user of the model inputs the model correlation and 
sensitivity parameters into a spreadsheet template. These parameters are then used to 
perform the model calculations and display the results. @Risk allows for further flexibility 
to analyze simulation results by enabling users to customize the formatting and content 
of reports. 
 
Model Description Window  
The model description window as shown in Figure 2 is descriptive in nature and 
provides the user with a summary of the Miu-Ozdemir equations and variables, their 
respective distributions, and how they are related to each other. For example, it is a 10 
quick way to verify that the systematic risk factor,  t X , is standard-normally distributed 
and is related to the systematic PD and LGD risks by way of the sensitivity 
parameters PD   and LGD  . 
 
 
 Figure 2. Model Description Window 
 
Simulation Window 
The simulation window enables the user to input all the model parameters (see 
Figure 3). The sensitivity and correlation parameters chosen by the user are reflected in 
the panel labeled “correlation parameters.” The user can either enter the parameter 
values directly into the spreadsheet, or can click the button directly above the 
“correlation parameters” panel.  
 11 
 
Figure 3: Simulation Window 
 
Input Model Sensitivities 
In Figure 4, the input model sensitivities dialog box allows the specification of the 
idiosyncratic and systematic sensitivities, as well as the pair wise PD and LGD 
correlations. A key assumption that we make is that the systematic and idiosyncratic 
sensitivities are equal (see Miu and Ozdemir). If a user would like to specify this 
assumption as such, he or she can conveniently enter a single value for each pair of 
systematic and idiosyncratic sensitivities. For example, if both the systematic 
sensitivities are equal to the square root of 0.8, we can enter the expression: “= 
SQRT(0.8)” into the dialog box labeled “systematic PD sensitivity = systematic LGD 











Figure 4. Input Model Sensitivities Dialog Box 
 
 
Figure 5. Input Loss Parameters Dialog Box 
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Input Loss Parameters 
The Input Loss Parameters dialog box enables the user to input the 
specifications of the loss distributions used to translate the observed LGD rates into their 
standard-normally distributed equivalents (see Figure 5). The application provides the 
necessary functionality to translate the individual LGD risks 
i
t l  into their corresponding 
beta-distributed loss. Based on preliminary testing, we found that the Box-Cox
2 
transformation may be a very useful and often-applicable transformation of the observed 
LGD values as well. 
 
 
Figure 6. Results Window 
Results Window 
The Results Window gives a summary of the economic capital requirements of a 
given set of model parameters at the 99
th and 99.9
th percentiles (see Figure 6). Using 
@Risk’s built-in distribution-fitting capabilities, we can further investigate and evaluate 
the input and output distributions both graphically and numerically. 
While precisely reproducing Miu and Ozdemir’s results would have been ideal in 
validating the model, limited computer processing and memory capacity necessitated 
that we minimize the number of simulations and iterations necessary to best 
approximate Miu and Ozdemir’s simulation outcomes. We determined that 300 
                                                 
2 The popular Box-Cox method attempts to transform the distribution of a continuous variable into 
an approximately standard normally-distributed range of values and is available in most statistical 
packages. We apply the computational form specified by Johnson and Wichern (2001). 14 
simulations each consisting of 300 iterations was the most optimal combination of 
simulations and iterations that gave us comparable results while striking the right 
balance between the validity of the probability distributions being generated and the 
simulation running-time. Indeed, 300 iterations is a widely-used rule-of-thumb standard 
that allows a distribution to adequately approximate its true density
3.  
 
Applying the Miu-Ozdemir Model to Agricultural Loans 
 
  We hypothesize that farm real estate and intermediate term loans may 
reasonably exhibit a significant level of systematic risk, which would make for a good 
case-study. Further, if it is reasonable to assume that the creditworthiness of agricultural 
borrowers depends on the value of their assets, we surmise that variations in agricultural 
land values are a plausible proxy for the systematic risk factor ( t X ) which drives default 
and loss given default rates at the industry and lender levels.  By extending the analysis 
to incorporate years in which land values were volatile (the “farm crisis” of the early 
1980s) we can simulate the effects of an economic cycle on the agricultural lender’s 
portfolio and economic capital (see Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7. Agricultural Loan Portfolio Simulation 
 
                                                 
3 We specify the “Latin Hypercube” random number generator as the sampling option. The Latin 
Hypercube method is a stratified-sampling algorithm especially conducive to the goal of attaining 
stabilization or “convergence” of a distribution much more efficiently than traditional sampling 
algorithms. 15 
The model is calibrated to the agricultural lender’s portfolio by identifying and 
measuring the key correlations in the model. These correlations are between; land 
values and PD, land values and LGD, and PD and LGD. We will use the Minnesota 
agricultural land values series provided by the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA, 2009) at the national and state levels during 1950-2008 (Appendix A). 
The time-series of default and loss-given-default data provided by AgriBank 
spans a limited time horizon, 2002 through 2008, a period of time during which the 
agricultural industry was relatively prosperous and defaults were at historically low 
levels.  
Due to insufficient data from the 1980s, reliable farm credit default and loss data 
is unavailable for the years corresponding to the farm financial crisis. Thus, we employ a 
credit officer survey to generate a proxy for the actual historical data.  Our goal was to 
elicit expert estimates of the timing and the severity of the farm financial crisis with 
respect to this specific lender.  
  While there was some variation in their peak default estimates, the responding 
credit officers all agreed that 1986 was the year the Association’s credit portfolio 
experienced the most stress. Further, responses indicated that the pre-farm crisis default 
rates were in the 0%-2% range. In contrast, the peak default rate ranged from 4.5% to 
40% for real-estate loans, and 6% to 20% for intermediate term loans. 
The survey responses were combined with actual historical Association level 
default data from the years 1999 through 2008. As a result, we had three sets of default 
data series, each consisting of 12 observations. 10 of these observations were from the 
actual 1999-2008 historical data, and 2 observations were based on the respondents’ 
answers about the high default years in the early 1980s. Each observation consisted of 
the number of borrowers current at the start of the given year ( t n ) and the number of 
these borrowers who defaulted by that year’s end ( t k ). Recall that the systematic PD 
risk as a function of our chosen systematic risk factor (land values), and it is defined by 
the linear equation t PD t PD t X P ,      . Deriving the systematic PD sensitivity 
parameter, , PD  then becomes a matter of estimating the linear regression of the time-
series for systematic PD risk on the standard-normalized land values series.    
Introducing Minnesota land values into the investigation of the systematic 
dependency of the credit risks sheds more light on the overall systematic dependency of 16 
the credit risks. A graphical display of - t P ,  t L  and the Minnesota land values series 
helps us appreciate any underlying systematic trends more intuitively (see Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8.  Systematic Credit Risks and Land Values, 1999-2008. 
 
Due to the limited number of observations available and noise apparent in the 
data, we choose to apply the most statistically-significant systematic sensitivity estimate 
obtained via linear regression. We (more conservatively) use our regression sensitivity 
estimates of 0.98 and -0.98, for  PD   and  LGD   respectively, through the rest of our 
subsequent analyses. Before moving ahead, however, it is worth asking: are the 
coefficient estimates obtained by linear regression reasonable?  
The business of agricultural lending is relatively sector-specific. That is, the value 
of an agricultural lender’s credit portfolio may depend heavily on the overall financial and 
economic health of the agricultural industry. If covariant risk is a problem, it is because 
farms and/or agribusinesses are sensitive to a set of market-wide factors or forces that 
adversely affect many clients at once.  Those factors may be more significant 
determinants of credit risk than the uncorrelated borrower-specific risks that may exist. In 
this paper we examine a predominantly secured subset of agricultural real-estate loans 
and intermediate-term loans. A sudden decline in the value of farm land may imply an 
unexpected loss of income to the farmer. If the farmer defaults on his/her debt, any 
recovery made by the lender upon possession of the collateral will likely be at a lower 
value because the market as a whole experiences stress, and the collateral is less 
valuable than when the loan was originated.   17 
Thus, the value of farm land used as collateral to back these loans is an indicator 
of both the obligor’s ability to repay debt and the resulting loss on an outstanding 
exposure if the borrower defaults. However, if this is true, the correlation parameters we 
have estimated ( 08 . 0
2  PD R  and  9 . 0
2  LGD R ) seem to be counter-intuitive: shouldn’t we 
expect both systematic correlations to be reasonably high? In fact, an
2
PD R value of about 
8% is reasonable. We see that this value has an associated long-run probability of 
default of slightly less than 1%. This means that in the long run about 1 out of every 100 
loans goes into default. This suggests that the agricultural industry is a relatively stable 
one, except for the farm financial crisis years in the 1980s. There are different types and 
sizes of farms and some farms are better able to continue to operate through a period of 
moderate-to-severe systematic shocks than others. Therefore, even though farms and 
farmland values may be negatively impacted at a specific point in time, all obligors are 
not likely to go into default simultaneously. However, loans of farms that actually do 
default at approximately the same time are subject to the same appraisal of their 
collateral, because this appraisal is a market-wide valuation of the worth of the sector-
specific assets that are used to guarantee the loans.  
 
Table 1. Calibrating the Idiosyncratic Sensitivities to Reported Default    
  Frequencies 

















1982  -8.41%  200 3 1.5% 300 3  1%
1986  -22.72%  200 10.5 5.2% 300 14  4.6%
  
The agricultural sector, and the specific loan portfolio we are looking at, may be 
subject to a significant degree of market-wide risk. Yet, because farming is generally a 
stable industry, we expect that any individual borrower has a low-to-moderate borrower-
specific risk of default. Thus, we will explore low levels of idiosyncratic sensitivity in the 
model application.  We also assume that the idiosyncratic risks (for default and loss 
given default) are of equal magnitude ( PD  = | | LGD  ). For convenience we will refer to 
the equal idiosyncratic risk magnitudes as 2  . We evaluate an appropriate level of 18 
2  that best approximates the default frequencies observed from the lender survey and 
the lender’s historical data. These results are reported in Table 1. 
As we conduct the simulation analysis we hold the systematic risk factor ( t X ) 
fixed at the standard-normal value that represents the annual percentage change in land 
values at the peak and immediately before the farm crisis years. We simulate a 
distribution of 300 year-end portfolio values, each consisting of 300 borrowers for 
robustness. The model setup in @Risk generates the corresponding number of defaults 
for each year-end portfolio value. We compare the average of the number of defaults in 
all the portfolio-values generated to the default frequencies reported by the credit staff in 
1982 and 1986. As expected, the low level of idiosyncratic sensitivity reported in Table 1 
allows us to approximate the observed default frequencies almost exactly. The simulated 
default frequencies are reported next to the reported frequencies at the peak of the cycle 
(1986) and immediately before the cycle (1982). These two frequencies correspond 
relatively well.  
 
Stress-Testing the Portfolio 
 
  The analysis is concluded by stress-testing the calibrated Miu-Ozdemir model by 
anticipating specific percentage changes for the chosen systematic risk factor (land 
values). These percentage changes are used to derive their standard-normally 
distributed equivalents (via the Box-Cox transformation, where necessary).  Thus, we 
need to find appropriate interpolations for specific percentage declines within the range 
of the observed percentage changes. Specifically, we are interested in evaluating the 
economic capital requirement when land values decline by 5%, 10%, 15% and 22.72% 
(which was their highest year-on-year decline, reported in 1986). We seek to answer the 
question: “If the agricultural sector again experienced significant financial stress, and 
land values changed from their current values by the same proportionate shift as during 
the farm credit crisis, how would this impact the economic capital requirement of the 
intermediate-term and real-estate loan portfolios?” 
We compare the “markup” to economic capital to the economic capital generated 
from the baseline scenario (which corresponds to an expected 6.3% increase in land 
values). We stress the portfolio relative using downward shifts in the land values series 
to capture deviations from the recent trend of expected gains.  19 
  If the most recent Minnesota land value estimate (in our case the 2008 value of 
$2970/acre) experiences similar percentage losses to those exhibited by land values 
through the farm crisis years, by how much should this particular agricultural lender mark 
up their economic capital estimates in order to compensate for a downturn in the 
economy? The annual percentage land value declines of interest are 0% (the baseline), 
5%, 10%, 15%, and the historical 1986 decline of 22.72%. In order to interpolate the 
percentage changes not directly observed in the series, we use a simple linear 
regression to perform a fit of the observed values’ standard-normal equivalents (via the 
Box-Cox method, where necessary) on the actual percentage changes. Of course, since 
one variable is merely the rescaling of another, the fit is perfect, allowing us to 
interpolate the standard-normal equivalents of the 0%, 5%, 10% and 15% declines.  
   We use the model parameters calibrated to the agricultural loan data to simulate 
a hypothetical loan portfolio of 300 borrowers experiencing a systematic risk that is 
centered about the standard-normal equivalents of the percentage declines. For each 
percentage decline, we evaluate the percentage markup that is required to increase the 
economic capital from the baseline level (0% change) to that of the relatively stressed 
level.  
 







99 Percentile Level  99.9 Percentile Level 
Economic 
Capital  %Markup  Economic 
Capital  %Markup 
+6.3% 3  (1%)  7.71  0%  8.09  0% 
0% 4  (1.1%)  12.09  57%  21.59  167% 
-5% 5  (1.7%)  22.01  185%  26.45  227% 
-10% 8  (2.6%)  23.49  205%  38.86  380% 
-15% 10  (3.3%)  29.75  286%  41.09  408% 
-22.72% 16  (5.3%)  37.16  382%  44.52  450% 
 
In Table 2 we summarize the results of the stress-test analysis. For example, if 
agricultural land values decline by 5%, the average number of defaults is expected to be 
equal to 5, which is equal to a default rate of 5/300 = 1.7%.  Recall, we are simulating 
300 borrowers each owing one dollar in a year’s time.  
 20 
Table 3. Economic Capital per Dollar of Exposure 














+6.3% 7.71  2.6%    +6.3%  8.09  2.6% 
0% 12.09  4.0%    0%  21.59  7.2% 
-5% 22.01  7.3%    5%  26.45  8.8% 
-10% 23.49  7.8%    10%  38.86  13.0% 
-15% 29.75  9.9%    15%  41.09  13.7% 
-22.72% 37.16  12.4%    -22.72%  44.52  14.5% 
 
From the perspective of the lender, we can think of economic capital as the 
proportion at risk of one dollar over a specified time horizon at a given confidence level. 
For example, an anticipated decline of 15% in land values will result in 9.9% of every 
dollar in the portfolio being at risk over the coming year, at the 99% confidence level 
(see column 3 in Table 3). 
In Table 2 we report the average (expected) number of defaults in the distribution 
of year-end portfolio values.  This gives us the probability-of-default estimate, PD. For 









Solving this equation for the implied LGD rate yields LGD = 0.24 or 24%. The actual 
observed average LGD of the loan portfolio is approximately 20%. Given the limited 
number of simulation cycles implemented here, we can see that the simulation estimates 
are comparable to what has been actually observed. This tells us that the baseline 
simulation is adequately calibrated to the lender’s actual experience, and suggests that 
that the estimates relative to the baseline, and the chosen model parameters, are quite 
reasonable. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
  We explore the Miu-Ozdemir model by incorporating farmland values as the 
systematic risk factor that drives credit defaults and loan losses. Because an agricultural 
credit portfolio is largely undiversified due to its dependence on the financial wellbeing of 
a single sector in the economy, we began with the hypothesis that agricultural loans 21 
would show a significant degree of systematic risk.  This expectation proved to be true in 
the simulation model application. The real estate and intermediate-term loan categories 
exhibit a strong correlation between their systematic PD and LGD risks. This correlation 
represents a significant and positive systematic risk sensitivity to land values in the 
portfolio of the Association. 
  An advantage of the approach used here is that systematic sensitivities can be 
obtained without explicitly modeling the market-wide risk factor (Miu and Ozdemir, 
2005). We have shown that at the same time, the Miu-Ozdemir model is sufficiently 
flexible to allow the explicit modeling of the chosen systematic risk driver. Given the 
limitations of the loan data in our study this is somewhat of a necessity.  
Using historical and surveyed default rate data, we are able to calculate the 
sensitivity of systematic PD to land values. We find that the correlation of the systematic 
PD risk to changing land values is positive and reasonably strong. The pairwise LGD 
correlation estimate characterizes an exceptionally strong systematic relationship 
between the observed LGD values. This is reasonable due to the specific types of loans 
in the lender’s portfolio.  Close to 75% of these loans are well-secured or adequately-
secured. The loan categories evaluated in this study, real-estate mortgages and 
intermediate-term loans, are traditionally secured by farm real estate as the dominant 
source of collateral Therefore, the portfolio exhibits strong dependence on the value of 
the collateral guaranteeing these loans.  
Farm real estate values are sensitive to the economic performance of the 
agricultural sector overall. Although it is not an instantaneous relationship, when 
agricultural commodity prices fall the value of farmland also falls. Further, some of this 
collateral is industry-specific to the degree that it is difficult, if not impossible, to sell the 
collateral outside of the agricultural industry. For example, farming equipment and 
machinery has little or no application outside of the agricultural industry. Similarly, many 
agricultural buildings and structures have a single agricultural use (e.g., storage facilities 
and barns).  Therefore, when the agricultural sector performs poorly, agricultural lenders 
may have to write off a greater degree of any exposures outstanding because the 
lenders cannot recoup 100% of the collateral that was secured when the loans were 
originated and the sector was performing more favorably. This explains the generally 
high correlation between the individual observations of loss given default, since the 
collateral across borrowers at any point in time experiences a similar proportionate 
change in value. 22 
We conclude that the model explored in this paper provides a useful framework 
for empirical analysis. It gives credit risk practitioners a consistent way to account for the 
relationship between credit default rates and loss given default rates. The framework 
enables us to develop a simulation model which can serve as an effective credit risk 
management tool, either as a stand-alone application or as an aid to informing lender 
decisions which may be made in conjunction with other tools and methods.  23 
 
Appendix A: Minnesota and Wisconsin Value of Land and Buildings (per acre) 
(Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture) 
 
   Minnesota Wisconsin    Minnesota  Wisconsin
1950 84  89  1981  1281 1,152 
1951 98  99  1982  1272 1,144 
1952 107  105  1983  1165  1,113 
1953 109  107  1984  1131  1,104 
1954 104  101  1985 898  944 
1955 109  101  1986 694  836 
1956 119  107  1987 587  777 
1957 129  116  1988 700  826 
1958 143  122  1989 747  845 
1959 152  131  1990 810  801 
1960 155  133  1991 881  849 
1961 150  137  1992 884  865 
1962 156  144  1993 910  925 
1963 158  143  1994 914  968 
1964 162  150  1995 950  1,040 
1965 167  155  1996  1030  1130 
1966 176  165  1997  1090  1170 
1967 188  182  1998  1160  1240 
1968 201  193  1999  1240  1450 
1969 216  213  2000  1320  1700 
1970 226  232  2001  1400  1950 
1971 231  255  2002  1500  2150 
1972 241  274  2003  1600  2300 
1973 269  328  2004  1790  2470 
1974 338  389  2005  2060  2790 
1975 429  434  2006  2340  3100 
1976 529  496  2007  2700  3640 
1977 672  598  2008  2970  3850 
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